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Economic Coercion and Power 
Redistribution during Wartime
Rosella Cappella Zielinski, phD* 
War is an opportunity to revise the distribution of power among states in a short amount of time. While most attention is placed on the changes in the relative power of the loser in a hegemonic war, argu-ably some of the most important changes happen within victorious 
alliances. Power redistribution does not take the form of the destruction of an ally’s 
military forces but through economic coercion. The primary mechanism by which an 
ally can engage in this coercion is via exploiting its role as a creditor. 
Creditor allies are increasingly present during wartime. The author finds that, 
since 1950, external sources of war finance have far exceeded domestic sources.1 Be-
fore 1950, 52 percent of belligerents engaged in foreign debt, whereas 72 percent have 
in the post-World War II era. The figures are more dramatic when one considers all 
forms of foreign war finance. Before 1950, 25 percent of states used resources from 
abroad to cover 25 percent or more of the costs of war; after 1950, 80 percent of states 
relied on resources from abroad to cover 25 percent or more of the costs of war. As 
credit becomes central to war-fighting ability, states with poor credit are more likely 
to form alliances with states that maintain favorable access to international capital 
markets.2
Given this increasing potential for economic coercion, under what conditions 
can a state use economic coercion against an ally? The various literatures on sovereign 
debt, economic statecraft, and alliances overlook economic coercion during wartime. 
Works that examine lending emphasize debt repayment ability. The literature does 
not account for the prerogative of lending states and the desire to extract concessions 
beyond repayment with interest. The economic statecraft literature, emphasizing 
peacetime conditions or wartime denial, does consider how states can exploit their 
allied relationships for gain beyond advancing the war effort. The alliance literature 
overlooks power redistribution amongst allies, focusing on power redistribution be-
tween alliances or the effect of power shifts on alliance formation and cohesion. 
*Rosella Cappella Zielinski is an assistant professor of Political Science at Boston University who special-
izes in the study of the political economy of national security. Her book How States Pay for Wars (2016 with 
Cornell University Press) provides the first cross-national study of war finance. Her other works explore the 
relationships between war finance, public opinion, and military effectiveness.
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To fill the gap in the literature, I argue economic coercion occurs due to war fi-
nance. When a belligerent is unable to purchase necessary imports for the war effort, 
the state will need to engage in a loan from an ally. The extent of dependency varies 
with domestic arms production, the structure of the nation’s currency reserves, and 
the intensity of the war effort. Wartime dependency is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for economic coercion. Coercion occurs when the costs of coercion are low, 
particularly when it does not damage the war-fighting capability of the dependent 
state.
To explore the extent to which power can be transferred amongst allies via eco-
nomic coercion, I engage in extreme and similar case selection—the United States as 
a creditor to the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union during World War II. Both 
states needed to purchase goods from the United States to effectively fight the war. 
The United Kingdom engaged in various attempts at self-sufficiency, but the war ef-
fort made it impossible. Through the extension of the Lend-Lease loan, the United 
States endeavored to move the world’s economic center from London to New York 
without damaging the war effort. In the Soviet Union, the overarching goals re-
mained to use Lend-Lease aid to extract concessions to promote an international 
environment favorable to American interests. Despite the urging of some within his 
administration, President Franklin D. Roosevelt perceived it too costly to engage in 
economic coercion against the Soviets, as the Red Army was key to defeating the 
Nazi war machine.
The case study findings suggest an unexplored element of power transition 
theory. Power transition theory argues that when a dissatisfied challenger state rises 
to parity and desires to change the status quo, it often seeks to do so by engaging in 
conflict.3 War outcome redistributes power in favor of either the challenger or domi-
nant power. The underlying assumptions of the power transition theory suggest dis-
satisfaction of and desire to change the status quo as the impetus of conflict outbreak. 
The findings of this article suggest opportunities for states to shift the status quo may 
arise without forewarning. Moreover, shifts in the status quo can occur by exploiting 
conflict settings versus engaging in conflict itself.
The article proceeds as follows. I discuss the various sovereign debt, economic 
statecraft, and alliance literatures. I then present my argument. I develop the neces-
sary conditions for wartime dependency and then discuss under what circumstances 
states exploit that dependency. Subsequently, I discuss my case selection and test my 
argument. I first present the conditions that led to British dependency on US Lend-
Lease aid and the American decision and ability to exploit that dependency. Follow-
ing the same format as the American case, I discuss the degree of Soviet dependency 
and the US decision to not exploit that dependency. I conclude with a brief discussion 
of other extreme cases and implications for our understanding of power transition 
amongst allies.
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Sovereign Debt, Economic Statecraft, and Alliance Literatures
The ability to garner resources is a necessary component to any war effort. While 
some states finance their wars domestically, others turn to sources outside their bor-
ders. Scholars have examined the relationship between wartime creditor and debtor 
states through (a) postwar state decline, (b) postwar debt repayment, (c) war outcome, 
and (d) the ability to finance a war.4 These works suggest wartime lending is contin-
gent upon, and the terms of the agreement vary with, the ability of the debtor state to 
pay the creditor state back.5 Belligerents whose economic foundations are weak, 
whose leaders do not commit to debt repayment, or whose ability to win the war is 
questionable are subject to high-interest rates. This literature does not account for 
concessions by the debtor that extend beyond direct monetary compensation. 
Also, when the motivations of the debtor to engage in foreign war finance have 
been examined, the underlying assumption is a domestic choice—that it is either 
economically or politically cheaper than raising taxes.6 These scholars often treat all 
debt as the same regardless of the source—domestic or foreign. Thus, they overlook 
the motivations for a state to turn abroad for resources, especially when they risk 
being beholden to the terms and conditions of another state.
The wartime debt literature does not account for the creation of potential cred-
itor–debtor relationships and the economic statecraft literature under-theorizes the 
conditions that allow for wartime economic coercion. First, when economic statecraft 
is discussed during wartime, the focus is on wartime denial. The goal of these works 
is to understand how states can use their economic resources to undermine the ene-
my’s war effort.7 These works concern themselves with attempts by national strate-
gists to deny the enemy access to their own strategic resources and manufacturers 
through export embargoes and depriving the enemy of imports from important neu-
tral states by using diplomatic and military means to dissuade neutrals from export-
ing to the enemy, as well as preemptive buying to divert supplies from the enemy or 
denying financing.8 These works do not account for how allies can exploit their own 
relationships for gain beyond advancing the war effort. 
Second, the economic statecraft literature emphasizes exploiting existing de-
pendencies: reliance on another state for a specific good is exogenous. For example, 
Albert O. Hirschman9 discussed how asymmetric trade relations can create depen-
dencies exploitable in the future, especially during wartime when states most need 
foreign trade.10 These works do not address how dependencies are created quickly due 
to the war effort.
Third, the literature does not adequately address the difference between wartime 
and peacetime coercion. During peacetime, the ability to find substitutes is lower 
relative to wartime. For example, sanctioned states “escaped this vulnerability inter-
dependence” by “engaging in smuggling, establishing resource conservation programs, 
developing new markets for their products, and creating substitutes for embargoed 
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goods.”11 Wartime creates unique constraints on a state’s economy—trade embargos, 
potential trade partners hurt by the war, an inability to divert internal resources as 
they are needed for the war effort, capital flight, and decreased credit ratings—that 
make finding substitutes much more difficult. In addition, the time horizon for state 
and leadership survival may not allow for the creation of such long-term substitutes. 
To match the adversary, the state needs inputs for the war immediately. Leadership 
survival literature suggests the penalty for leaders who either lose a war or for war 
efforts that are going poorly range from the population voting the leader out of office 
to death. The result of this wartime cost–benefit analysis is higher rates of compliance 
to the pressures of economic statecraft. 
The alliance literature does not address why and how power gets redistributed 
amongst allies, instead emphasizing power distribution and redistribution between 
allies and target states, particularly the effect of alliance duration12 or the ability of an 
alliance partner to influence the alliance.13 These studies overlook the transfer of 
power from one ally to another via exploiting alliance dependency. Similar to the 
economic statecraft literature, those that study alliance dependency emphasize peace-
time conditions, exploring how dependency affects fears of entrapment or abandon-
ment14 or bargaining power within the alliance.15 As Patricia A. Weitsman noted,16 
alliances formed during peacetime often dissolve once war begins. This suggests that 
peacetime alliances serve different purposes than their wartime counterparts and the 
insights we generate regarding peacetime alliances do not necessarily apply to their 
operation during wartime.17 
By exploring the ability of a state to garner resources for war, this article builds 
upon the sovereign debt, economic statecraft, and alliance literatures. The following 
section theorizes the economic and military conditions under which an ally can revise 
the distribution of power in its favor. It hypothesizes the necessary conditions for 
wartime economic coercion to take place and engages in a cost-benefit analysis of 
when leaders will seize the opportunity.
Wartime Economic Coercion—Wartime Dependency
The ability to exercise economic coercion—the threat or act by a sender 
government(s) to disrupt economic exchange with the target state—is conditional on 
dependency.18 Wartime dependency occurs when a state needs inputs to fight its war 
effort from an ally and does not have the means to purchase them. Dependency is 
contingent upon the degree of control over the supply of something a state values, an 
intense need for this supply, and the cost of compliance is less than the costs of doing 
without the supply.19 During wartime, control over the supply of both war inputs and 
credit to purchase them is concentrated in the hands of specific states, thus decreasing 
the availability of substitutes. There is also an intense need for this supply. Wartime 
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creates conditions in which internal mobilization of resources becomes limited. Ad-
ditionally, as wars threaten state and leadership survival, the costs of noncompliance 
to leaders are high.
Leaders have three ways of acquiring inputs for war: they can seize them, make 
them, or buy them.20 Inputs for war include manpower, equipment (typically reflected 
via a defense industry or a civilian industry that is convertible to purchase inputs for 
war coupled with raw materials), foodstuffs, and transportation assets.21 When a state 
can supply its entire war effort via domestic inputs, it negates the need to purchase 
inputs from abroad and, thus, the need to obtain a currency loan to do so.22
When a state is unable to supply its war effort domestically, it needs to look 
outside its borders, creating the potential for reliance on an ally as creditor.23 While 
all war inputs may need procurement from abroad, military equipment, primarily 
finished goods such as airplanes or battleships versus subcomponents, is the most 
expensive and difficult to obtain. In an era of capital-intensive complex weapons sys-
tems, finished goods are particularly costly, as supply is limited to countries possess-
ing the most highly developed technology.24 As the need for military equipment in-
creases, especially expensive finished goods so does the cost of purchasing those 
goods. Dependency arises when the currency of belligerent state diminishes to critical 
levels, preventing the purchase of needed war inputs.
It should be noted that while the belligerent state may be dependent on the 
military goods of the ally, financial dependencies are more exploitable. If the belliger-
ent state needs to purchase goods from abroad, it is profitable for a supplier state to 
sell its goods to any buyer. As Hirschman noted, “It will generally be much easier to 
switch imports than exports, all countries being ready to sell and not ready to buy.”25 
Extending credit, however, is inherently risky. During wartime, there is no guarantee 
that the state will repay its debt. Furthermore, there are fewer credit substitutes. 
While multiple states may be able to sell inputs for war, currency loans are in short 
supply, as the borrowing states need a loan in the currency of the supplier state.
During peacetime, states can adjust their economy to increase their currency 
levels. A state may encourage exports, prompting the flow of currency into the coun-
try, or reduce imports, keeping needed currency from flowing out of the country, to 
redress the imbalance. Wartime negates this self-sufficiency. During wartime, exports 
often become severely limited through decreased trade. Trading partners are hurt by 
the war, states enact blockades or sanctions, or states need industries that normally are 
export oriented for the war effort.26 Simultaneously, the need to import goods in-
creases, as the state needs to supplement goods that the state is no longer able to 
produce to supply the armed forces. The decrease in exports results in a decrease of 
reserve currency, while the increase in imports increases the need for it. The need for 
currency further increases when a state is maintaining forward operating bases or 
fighting abroad and purchasing goods in theatre.27 
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Debtor dependency varies with the structure of the debtor state’s economy. 
States with high levels of existing currency reserves and those with assets abroad, i.e., 
holdings of foreign direct or portfolio investment, which can be liquidated in ex-
change for the supplier state’s currency can prolong the need to engage in a currency 
loan, as they have more existing resources from which to draw. Also, reserve currency 
states are in a unique position to avoid these financial difficulties because they can run 
a balance of payments deficit.28 The demand for a state’s reserve currency provides the 
state with a unique ability to accrue other national currencies through voluntary ac-
cumulations of liabilities abroad rather than through losses of gold or gold-exchange.29 
Finally, the extent of debtor dependency varies with the intensity of the war 
effort. As the intensity of the war increases so does the state’s limit of production 
capacity as well as leadership and state survivability: “In the long run. . . despite sub-
stitution, some limit to the inputs either of raw materials or labour will be reached, 
the curve of production will flatten out, and the economy may then be said to have 
achieved its war potential.”30 As the war expands, the state needs more goods to 
confront the enemy. Simultaneously, domestic production reaches its limit, and the 
state will need to purchase increased amounts of goods from abroad.
Additionally, as the war becomes more intense, leaders will feel more pressure to 
win the war to avoid losing power. There is a considerable amount of scholarship 
linking war outcome and the extent to which the state suffers war casualties with 
leadership survival.31 As Susan Strange wrote, “The greater the perceived threat to 
security, the higher price will be willingly paid and the greater risk accepted.”32 
In sum, wartime creates dependencies that do not exist during peacetime. When 
a state needs to procure inputs for the war from abroad and does not have the cur-
rency to pay for it, it will need to engage in a currency loan, resulting in a reliance on 
the creditor state. This reliance on a state creates the potential for coercion. The po-
tential for coercion increases with the size of the loan, when the goods needed are 
critical to the war effort, and war intensity increases—either by expanding scope and 
intensity or the war shifts from a limited war of choice to a total or existential war.
Wartime Economic Coercion—Exploiting Dependency
States want power and wartime debtor dependence provides the necessary con-
ditions for states to attain it. Yet wartime economic coercion is an uncommon event. 
Under what conditions do creditor states take advantage of this debtor dependency? 
Creditor states engage in a cost-benefit analysis. They want to obtain concessions and 
increase their power when the costs of coercion are low: “If the benefits do not out-
weigh the risks, they sit tight and wait for a more propitious moment.”33 During 
wartime, the cost-benefit analysis is centered on the war effort. These creditor states 
are in a delicate position: They want to extract concessions from the belligerent state(s) 
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yet avoid undermining the war effort, especially when fighting for a common cause. 
Thus, they will only seek concessions that affect nonwar fighting capabilities and do 
not negatively affect war outcome.
Case Selection
I test my argument with case study analysis to explore the necessary and suffi-
cient conditions of economic coercion.34 To highlight the variables of interest and 
provide insight into power transition theory, I engage in most similar and extreme 
case selection.35 The universe of cases is creditor–debtor dyads during wartime. War-
time creditor–debtor dyads consist of two states in which the debtor is a belligerent 
in a conflict, and the other is the creditor.36 Excluded is sovereign debt extended by 
foreign private creditors independent of their state of residence. Interstate loans may 
be serviced by a private creditor but are made either at the request of or in conjunc-
tion with the state.
To maximize the variance on the variables that create dependency,37 I explore 
World War II debtor states. The size and scope of the war meant self-sufficiency was 
difficult for those states that needed to purchase war inputs from abroad as trading 
partners were hurt, the ability to increase exports was diminished as war production 
increased, and war imports increased. Furthermore, it was a total war for various 
states; leaders were fighting for state survival. Within the World War II population 
of cases, I compare most similar cases—the experiences of the United Kingdom and 
Soviet Union as debtors to the United States (US). Both states were subject to the US 
Cash and Carry policy, and both eventually became reliant on American goods for 
the war effort, funded by American Lend-Lease loans. Yet the United States only 
waged economic coercion vis-à-vis the United Kingdom. It made no attempt to gar-
ner concessions from the Soviet Union. 
Quid Pro Quo: The United States and the United Kingdom
To effectively fight the Germans during World War II, the British needed ex-
pensive finished inputs for the war effort from the United States, and they did not 
have the gold or currency to purchase them. While the government made various 
attempts to increase their dollar holdings, war intensity prevented attempts at self-
sufficiency. By the summer of 1940, the British were debtor dependent. The American 
government capitalized on this dependency, attempting to shift the world financial 
center from London to New York.
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Dependency on the US
To fight the Axis powers, Britain had to supply itself and the war effort of the 
Empire. In the first 15 months of the war, the United Kingdom supplied 90.7 percent 
of the Empire’s munitions and 69.5 percent of munitions throughout the course of 
the war.38 Germany, however, out-produced Britain in almost every aspect of war 
supply until 1941.39 The British were also in need of raw materials. The defeat in 
Norway in April 1940 deprived Britain of its main source of timber, papermaking 
material, and iron ore. In the summer of 1940, with North African contracts broken 
due to the war, Britain was deprived of a large proportion of its imported steel-
making materials, phosphates, flax, hemp, and other essential commodities. Finally, 
with the closing of the Mediterranean route, the Axis disrupted trade with the Bal-
kans, removing another source of timber and materials.40 The primary external source 
for war input was the United States.
From the start of World War II to May 1940, the British bought war supplies 
from the United States with British currency reserves under the US policy of “cash-
and-carry,” purchasing American goods in cash. Britain was responsible for trans-
porting those goods across the Atlantic. Even prewar contracts had to be paid in full 
before the goods could leave American ports.41 This period of self-reliance was short-
lived due to short dollar supply, a worsening balance of payments position and the 
inability to float debt on the US market.42
To purchase needed goods, the British began an internal campaign to promote 
the flow of dollars into the country and keep any they had from flowing out through 
a series of import controls and export promotion. On 1 September 1939, the House 
of Commons passed the Import and Exports Customs Powers (Defense) Act, limit-
ing the “imports of luxuries and of goods of which there are sufficient home supplies 
in order to conserve exchange for the additional purchases of other products required 
in war time.”43 The British also sought to promote exports to the United States, en-
couraging exports of jute, rubber, tin, whisky, and furs.44 The government forced ex-
porters to bill clients at the official sterling–dollar exchange rate, higher than the free 
market rate traditionally used. Finally, the British also enforced “dollar-invoices” 
versus the often-used sterling invoices. The goal was to bring in as much hard cur-
rency from the bulk of certain exports with as little administrative interference as 
possible.
The demands of war proved too high and the British system of controls inade-
quate. The British needed the more expensive furnished munitions.45 Furthermore, in 
order to fight the war, Britain had to focus all of its manufacturing on the war effort, 
forcing it to abolish its export drive.46 In March 1940, the British reported that at the 
current rate of purchases, within two years, the United Kingdom would have given 
the United States all of its dollar assets.47 British prime minister Winston Churchill 
told US president Franklin D. Roosevelt that, “We shall go on paying dollars for as 
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long as we can, but I should like to feel reasonably sure that when we can pay no more 
you will give us the stuff all the same.”48
The events of late spring 1940 further exacerbated the British financial position. 
The fall of France and evacuation of Dunkirk forced the British to increase expendi-
tures. When the British evacuated the continent, they left all their newly produced 
war supplies49 and had to assume all of France’s contracts with the United States.50 
The war was increasing in intensity, and the British needed as many inputs as they 
could procure. Instead of rationing currency and conservative purchases, the British 
threw all the dollars they had into the war in the hope that the United States would 
continue providing supplies once they ran out.
Exploiting British Dependency
To help its ally, the Roosevelt administration introduced the Lend-Lease Bill to 
Congress in January 1941, and by the end of the war, extended $27,023 million in aid 
to Britain.51 In exchange for the extension of credit and aid, the administration 
wanted to shape the postwar world in favor of US interests, to continue its open-door 
policy that began during World War I, and reconstruct the world economy on the 
basis of a free marketplace to relieve their agricultural, industrial, and capital sur-
pluses.52 To do that, the United States wanted countries linked together by a world-
wide gold standard, not grouped into blocks by ties to specific reserve currencies.53 
The United States attempted to impose said changes throughout the 1930s. However, 
it was unable to end the British Imperial preference and sterling controls.54 The 
United States took advantage of its coercive power as a creditor to achieve the goals 
that it was unable to during the inter-war years:
Although American leaders grasped the potential leverage created by British 
dependence upon the United States, they did not consistently use that leverage 
between 1937 and March 1941. Before the actual outbreak of war, the American 
government could not resort to obvious coercion, fearing the Chamberlain min-
istry would seek a modus Vivendi with Germany. . . .Once the Lend-Lease Act 
became law, the temptation to use it as a means of obtaining economic conces-
sions from Britain—concessions which would promote economic multilateral-
ism as well as directly and indirectly benefit American economic expansion—be-
came too great to resist.55 
Treasury secretary Henry Morgenthau led the charge.56 He began by placing 
severe restrictions on the level of British gold and dollar reserves.57 When the British 
signed Lend-Lease, the allies agreed that the UK balance continue to be above the 
desired minimum of $600 million but below $1 billion and the British open discus-
sion on dismantling imperial preferences.58 The British resented Morgenthau’s re-
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quests yet had to acquiesce to his demands.59 To shift American policy, Prime Min-
ister Churchill messaged President Roosevelt:
While we will do our utmost and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make pay-
ments across the exchange, I believe that you will agree that it would be wrong in 
principle and mutually disadvantageous in effect if, at the height of this struggle, 
Great Britain were to be divested of all saleable assets so that after victory was 
won with our blood, civilization saved and time gained for the United States to 
be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to the bone.60 
Throughout the war, the United States tied the postwar order—the Atlantic 
Charter and Bretton Woods—to the extension of American aid.61 The financing of 
World War II cemented the sterling’s decline. The British need to procure inputs for 
the war from the United States and its inability to run a balance of payments deficit 
during World War II drastically hurt the sterling’s status once the war ended.
The dependency created during wartime continued into the postwar era. To 
begin to repair its economy, the British government approached the President Harry 
S. Truman administration for financial assistance. It was met with further coercive 
power by the United States in a “string of political conditions including early con-
vertibility of sterling-sponsoring an international trade conference, and ending dis-
crimination of dollar imports.”62 In response, Otto Clarke, civil servant in the Trea-
sury, stated, “Our right to be bilateral, to exploit our buying power and debtor position 
to expand our exports, would have been well sold for $5 billion grant in cash. But not 
for $4 billion at 2 percent interest.”63 While Britain despised the terms, their depen-
dent financial position forced their acceptance.
US policy undermined British autonomy, increased American gold holdings 
and solidified the decline of the sterling. There is no doubt that the war effort ham-
pered British power vis-à-vis other states in the international system. However, it was 
US creditor policy, the demanding of all gold reserves, and transfer of value assets that 
ensured decline. A 1945 British report estimated that the country lost roughly 25 
percent (£7,300 million) of its estimated prewar wealth (£30,000 million). Within 
this overall figure, more than half of prewar wealth (£4,200 million) was lost due to 
external disinvestment in the form of selling British overseas investments to pay for 
war imports. Internal disinvestment in nonessential industries amounted to £885 
million and the destruction of buildings, capital goods, and shipping due to war dam-
age £2,200 million.64
The United States and the Soviet Union
The Germans attacked the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941. Like the British, the 
Soviets needed to import goods for the war effort from the United States. During the 
early months of the eastern front, the Soviet Union purchased goods via Cash and 
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Carry followed by the Lend-Lease loan. Unlike the British case, the United States 
never attempted to engage in economic coercion. Not only did the United States not 
exploit the Soviets, it gave them special Lend-Lease treatment. President Roosevelt 
overrode suggestions that the United States should both be wary of Soviet intention 
and use Lend-Lease dependency to shape the postwar order in favor of US inter-
ests.65
Soviet Dependency
Akin to the UK, the Soviet Union needed to purchase goods from the United 
States to confront the German army. While its rearmament scheme prior to the war 
was similar to the Allies, it was initially more difficult for the Soviets to match the 
defense production results of the United States and United Kingdom, given “the low 
productivity, capital scarce Soviet industrial base” and the blow the blitzkrieg cam-
paign delivered to the Soviet military industrial machine.66 In September 1941, Stalin 
made clear to the United States that the Germans had considerable superiority over 
the Soviets in numbers of tanks and airplanes, obtained possession of two million 
tons of grain in the Ukraine and had the huge capacity to produce armaments in 
comparison with the more limited Soviet capacity. He also stated that German dicta-
tor Adolph Hitler and the Nazis would not be defeated by a blockade, starvation or 
bombing but only on the field of battle, and tanks and airplanes would be the ultimate 
deciding factor.67
Lend-Lease played a consistent role in the Soviet war effort, despite the massive 
expansion of Soviet industry and their industrial recovery. Overseas sources contrib-
uted up to one quarter of Soviet aircraft supplies and up to one-fifth of tank supplies 
in 1942.68 While the Soviets were able to meet their own armament and shell needs, 
American shipments of trucks, tractors, and tinned food provided the Red Army with 
decisive mobility in its westward pursuit of the retreating Wehrmacht. Thus, at their 
respective peaks, Britain and Soviet received comparable amounts of Lend-Lease 
aid.69
While reliance on external supplies was similar, overall Soviet dependency on 
US assistance regarding war outcome is nuanced. The Soviet’s industrial might plus 
reliance on winter conditions resulted in a different attitude vis-à-vis Lend-Lease aid 
than the British. The British consistently carried a tone of desperation. In contrast, 
while the Soviets acknowledged their need and weaknesses, they felt more secure in 
their war capabilities. In the words of Former British Director of Military Intelli-
gence and Head of the British Military Mission in Moscow, Lt Gen Sir Noel Mason-
MacFarlane, the Russians seem to be “confident of their strength but fully aware that 
they have a bitter struggle ahead of them.” 70
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Prospective Economic Coercion to Special Treatment
Before Operation Barbarossa, US–Soviet relations were sour. After Munich, 
where the Russians felt betrayed by Britain and France, and after the August 1939 
Nazi–Soviet pact, where the allies felt betrayed by Russia, suspicion on both sides 
sharpened.71 American policy reflected such suspicion. In August 1939, export li-
censes for production equipment and raw materials ordered in the United States by 
Amtorg Trading Corporation, the purchasing agency for the Soviet government in 
the United States, were refused, two Soviet air attaches were declared persona non 
grata, and various Soviet personnel in the United States were under restricted move-
ment.72 Even days before the invasion, which the Allies knew was imminent, Secre-
tary of State Cordell Hull cabled London and the US ambassador in the Soviet 
Union with the current American policy towards the Soviet Union: 
1. To make no approaches to the Soviet government; 
2. To treat any approaches to which the Soviet government makes toward us with 
reserve until such time as the Soviet government may satisfy us that it is not 
engaging merely in maneuvers for the purpose of obtaining unilateral conces-
sions and advantages for itself;
3. To reject any Soviet suggestions that we make concessions for the sake of 
“improving the atmosphere of American-Soviet relations” and to extract a 
strict quid pro quo for anything which we are willing to give the Soviet Union.73
The US ambassador overwhelmingly concurred with the policy stating that, in 
his experience, it is not possible to create “international good will” with the Soviets.74 
Once the war began, American policy towards the Soviet Union did an about-face. 
The notion of quid pro quo was discarded, and the Soviets received special Lend-
Lease treatment. Soviet funds were unfrozen, and an immediate loan was extended. 
Through October 1941, when Russia was eligible for Lend-Lease aid, Russia had to 
pay cash for purchased goods. Unlike the British, the Soviet government, regardless 
of its ability to purchase goods, was advanced $50,000,000 by the Defense Supplies 
Corporation to procure raw materials in the United States.75
Once Lend-Lease aid began, the Soviets were subject to special treatment.76 
Requests from Britain had to be accompanied by ample documentation proving need 
and ability to use and evidence indicating financial inability to otherwise obtain such 
assistance, including the disclosure of gold and dollar assets.77 In contrast, Soviet 
supply programs were formulated in separate protocols, which were subject to the 
control of the Munitions Assignment Board only in matters of minor detail, and the 
president agreed to cutbacks in these schedules of commitments only when transpor-
tation problems were insurmountable or when fulfillment of commitments interfered 
with a major American operation.78 W. Averell Harriman, US ambassador to the 
Soviet Union, advised the American delegates to the Moscow Conference that the 
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policy of the United States would be to “give and give and give, with no expectation 
of any return, with no thought of a quid pro quo.”79
Costly Coercion
Soviet support was paramount to ending the war and economic coercion would 
impede on that mission. After the German invasion, President Roosevelt’s advisors 
Harry Hopkins and Harriman, along with British supply minister William Maxwell 
Aitken, believed that the USSR, irrespective of whether it ultimately prevailed against 
the Wehrmacht, stood a chance to reduce German power by margins substantial 
enough to ensure British survival and, by extension, that of the North Atlantic com-
munity on whose integrity US wellbeing depended.80 Soviet involvement in the war 
effort as a key component to victory increased throughout the war. A top-level US 
strategic survey in the summer of 1943 observed, “Russia occupies a dominant posi-
tion and is the decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis in Europe.”81 
Also, President Roosevelt feared the USSR would make a separate peace with Ger-
many akin to the 1918 Brest-Litovsk treaty.82 He wanted to ensure that the Soviets 
did not just reclaim their Western boundaries but, in concert with the Allies, deliver 
a decisive blow against the Germans. 
To guarantee continued Soviet involvement in the war required cooperation 
between the two countries. If Lend-Lease aid was not perceived as sincere, the Sovi-
ets would be satisfied at securing its western boundaries and convincing Hitler not to 
engage in a spring offensive.83 Hopkins wrote to Brig Gen Philip R. Faymonville, the 
ranking Lend-Lease officer in Moscow, “Our willingness not to pry out economic 
information, because of its sharp contrast with British methods, established the in-
tegrity of our motives and built up a good will which should not be dissipated by 
inquiry into matters not germane to the purposes of supply conference.”84 Thus, “Give 
without stint became the mantra, in Hull’s phrase ‘all aid to the hilt.’”85 
The inability of the United States to directly assist the Soviets on the battlefield 
compounded the belief that economic coercion would hurt the joint war effort and 
American war aims. Due to limits in US armaments production (producing for the 
US war effort and sending goods to other Lend-Lease recipients) and involvement in 
the other campaigns including the Pacific theatre, the Americans were unable to 
provide what the Soviets were requesting, the opening of a second front to relive the 
Red Army from the German onslaught.86 US policymakers feared that if a second 
front did not materialize quickly and on a large scale, the Soviets “will be so deluded 
in their belief in our sincerity of purpose and will for concerted action that inesti-
mable harm will be done to the cause of the United Nations”87 Unable to open a 
second front, in order to mollify the Soviets, President Roosevelt promised to con-
tinue sending Lend-Lease aid.88 
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After the Tehran conference and plans for a second front had been agreed upon, 
Ambassador Harriman made the case to President Roosevelt to use Lend-Lease aid 
to shape the postwar order.89 He argued that the United States should, at a minimum, 
demand the same information from the Soviets as it did from Britain.90 After D-Day, 
cooperation with the Soviets decreased, and the ambassador continued to call for 
coercion, suggesting the only way to induce Soviet cooperation was to “make them 
feel their negative attitude will affect our willingness to cooperate with them on mat-
ters that have no immediate effect on the war.”91
President Roosevelt and his advisors rebuffed Ambassador Harriman’s sugges-
tions. While the military crisis had passed and a second front was now open, it was 
too risky to interrupt or change the conditions of Lend-Lease aid. Hopkins responded 
to the ambassador, “Since no one can now determine when the war will be over, it 
seems preferable that there should be no interruption in the procurement of supplies 
for the USSR war program in the event that hostilities should continue beyond nor-
mal expectations.”92 President Roosevelt also made it clear to Secretary of State Hull 
that Russia “continues to be a major factor in achieving the defeat of Germany.” Thus, 
maximum US aid and supplies should continue.93 
While the Soviets relied on American Lend-Lease aid to execute their war ef-
fort, President Roosevelt perceived it too costly to engage in economic coercion. 
Economic coercion would threaten the ability of the two states to share a common 
war aim of defeating Hitler, versus Soviet Union leader Joseph Stalin stopping at the 
state’s western boundaries. The inability of the United States to open a second front 
until the summer of 1944 further strained US–Soviet relations. The only way to ap-
pease Stalin was to continue uninterrupted, Lend-Lease aid.
Conclusion
War provides an opportunity to revise the distribution of power among states. 
While scholars place attention on the redistribution of power between the victors and 
defeated, this article demonstrates that the transfer of power can also occur within 
alliances. A creditor ally can exploit the dependency of a debtor ally to extract conces-
sions. Dependency occurs when a belligerent state needs to procure goods from 
abroad for the war effort and does not have the currency to pay for them. The extent 
of dependency varies with the volume and character of goods needed, particularly 
expensive finished goods, and the scope of the war, particularly existential or total 
wars. Dependency is a necessary but not sufficient condition for economic coercion 
amongst allies. Fighting for a common cause, leaders do not want to imperil the war 
effort. Thus, we can expect to see coercion take place when the costs to the war effort 
are low. 
ECONOMIC COERCION AND POWER REDISTRIBUTION  89
This article explored this relationship by comparing extreme and similar cases, 
British and Soviet dependency on American Lend-Lease loans. While both states 
relied on the United States, only the British were coerced. The United States at-
tempted to shift the financial center away from London to New York. In contrast, 
President Roosevelt perceived the costs of coercing the Soviets as too high. Exploit-
ing Lend-Lease dependency would lower the Soviet war aims at defending its west-
ern borders versus the preferred American total defeat of Hitler’s Germany. 
While further hypothesis testing here is not feasible, events during World War 
I suggest that economic coercion is associated with hegemonic wars. During the first 
years of World War I, Russia and France were unable to continue to supply their re-
spective war efforts.94 As a result, they turned to Britain to purchase goods for the 
war.95 Unable to pay for the goods in sterling, they engaged in currency loans from 
Britain. Capitalizing on Russian and French dependency, Britain exercised economic 
coercion, procuring Russian and French gold to preserve London as the world finan-
cial center.96 While Britain could exercise economic coercion vis-à-vis France and 
Russia, it was unable to defend itself from newfound US coercive power. If Britain 
were to effectively fight the expanding war, it would need to purchase goods from the 
United States,97 without enough dollars and gold to purchase American goods out-
right, Britain needed a dollar loan.98 President Woodrow Wilson exploited this new-
found debtor dependency in an attempt to decrease British domination of the world’s 
international financial system.99 
These findings suggest an additional agenda for power transition theory; na-
tional power can be manipulated by exploiting alliances during wartime. The US–UK 
case during World War II and the brief discussion of US–UK during World War I 
suggest that when costs are low, rising powers can benefit most when a declining 
power becomes financially dependent during a war. 
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